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NINTH CIRCUIT DENIES INSURER’S GAMBLE ON VACATUR IN NEVADA
By
Emma M. Kline*
I.

INTRODUCTION
In Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, the defendant

insurer’s motion to vacate the arbitration award upon reasons beyond the scope of
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was denied by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 The Court of Appeals explained that FAA
§ 10 commands the only circumstances in which a court may vacate an arbitral
award, which include standard contract defenses like fraud, duress, or corruption,
evident partiality on behalf of the arbitrator(s), arbitrator misconduct in
administering the proceeding, or excess arbitrator authority.2 Relying on Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. and Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache
Trade Services, Inc., the Court maintained that FAA §§ 10-11 “‘provide the
exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.’”3
II.

BACKGROUND
Lev Lagstein, M.D. (“Lagstein”), a cardiologist and disability examiner,

obtained an insurance policy from Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London
(“Lloyd’s”) in 1999.4 Lloyd’s agreed to pay Lagstein $15,000 per month for up to
fifteen years if an event occurred which prevented Lagstein from practicing

*
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1
Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. Nev.
2010).
2
Id. at 640 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)).
3
Id.; see Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008); see also
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2007).
4
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 638.
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medicine.5 When Lagstein developed heart disease in 2001, he filed for benefits
with Lloyd’s.6 By early 2002, Lloyd’s had yet to disburse benefits or make a
decision on Lagstein’s claim, forcing Lagstein to return to work against the advice
of his physicians.7 Lagstein still had not heard from Lloyd’s as of September 2003,
and he consequently filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada for “breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and unfair trade practices.”8 Lloyd’s motioned to stay the lawsuit
and submit the dispute to arbitration.9
Lagstein’s policy required both parties to select an arbitrator, and for the
two party-appointed arbitrators to select a third, neutral arbitrator.10 Lagstein chose
Jerry Carr Whitehead and Lloyd’s chose Ralph Williams, III.11 Whitehead and
Williams chose Charles Springer.12 The arbitrators each submitted a disclosure
form to the parties to ensure arbitrator neutrality.13 The first arbitration proceeding
lasted from July 11, 2006 through July 14, 2006.14 In the August 31, 2006 award,
the arbitrators found in Lagstein’s favor, but could not agree as to the appropriate
amount of damages.15 Arbitrators Springer and Whitehead believed that Lagstein
should receive the full value of his policy, estimated at $900,000, and an additional
$1,500,000 for emotional distress.16 Further, they believed that Lagstein was
entitled to punitive damages but were unsure as to the sum and ordered a separate
hearing to determine the award.17 Williams disagreed, believing that Lagstein was

5

Id.
Id.
7
Id. at 638.
8
Id.
9
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 638.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 638.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
6
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only entitled to $11,000 under his policy, and that he should not receive additional
emotional distress or punitive damages.18
The arbitrators held a separate punitive damages hearing on November 20
and 21, 1996, although Lloyd’s contended that the panel's jurisdiction had lapsed
after the initial hearing was completed.19 Whitehead and Springer again constituted
the majority, and concluded that Lagstein was entitled to $4,000,000 in punitive
damages.20
Lloyd’s filed a motion in district court to vacate the awards.21 The district
court agreed with Lloyd’s, and concluded that vacatur was appropriate as the
damages were excessive and the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the
law.22 Additionally, the district court found that the punitive damages award was
contrary to public policy, and that the arbitrators acted in excess of their
authority.23 Lagstein appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the district court.24
III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Vacatur of the Overall Arbitral Award
In reversing the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit began by explaining that the FAA limits judicial review of an arbitral
award by “enumerat[ing] limited grounds upon which a federal court may vacate,

18

Id. at 639.
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 639. Lloyd’s contention likely was based on the doctrine known as
functus officio, which provides that an arbitrator’s jurisdiction ceases at the point that the
award is rendered or the case is determined to be without merit.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 640.
19
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modify, or correct an arbitral award.”25 The Court claimed to rely exclusively on
FAA § 10(a) for the foundation of its analysis, and maintained that unless an award
contravenes either FAA § 10 or § 11, the court must enforce the award.26
1.

Excessive Arbitral Award

The Court of Appeals began by addressing Lloyd’s contention that the
arbitral panel issued an excessive award.27 It explained that although a court may
disagree with an arbitral award, it may not vacate simply because it would have
awarded a different amount of damages or decided the issue in a completely
dissimilar manner.28 When parties agree to arbitrate, they have vested the arbitral
panel with the authority to weigh the evidence on matters “such as the length and
severity of Lagstein’s disability,” and of Lloyd’s conduct.29 The Court explained
that “Section 10 of the FAA ‘does not sanction judicial review of the merits,’”
which is precisely the activity in which the district court engaged.30 The Court
therefore determined that the district court erred in vacating the panel’s award
solely because it disagreed with the size of the award.31
2.

Manifest Disregard of the Law

The Court next addressed Lloyd’s contention that the arbitrators acted in
manifest disregard of the law, and explained that an arbitrator does so when he or

25

Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
26
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) and explaining that FAA § 11 was not applicable to the
current case, as it allowed courts to modify or correct awards in the presence of clerical
errors or miscalculations) (emphasis added).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 640.
30
Id. (citing Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc. 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)).
31
Id.
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she recognizes the pertinent law and then fails to apply it.32 Although the district
court believed that the arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the law, the
court failed to point to a specific law that the arbitral tribunal identified and
ignored.33 Neither the district court nor Lloyd’s cited any Nevada statute or case
law that the arbitral tribunal intended to apply and then failed to do so. The Court
went on to explain that manifest disregard of the law is a “high standard for
vacatur,” and that “‘it is not enough . . . to show that the panel committed an
error—or even a serious error.’”34 Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed on
the issue of manifest disregard of the law.35
The Court of Appeals also rejected Lloyd’s claim that the arbitrators acted
in manifest disregard of the facts of the case and that the panel’s factual analysis
was “irrational.”36 Vacatur on the basis of improper factual analysis would require
the courts to engage in merits based review, which is antithetical to the arbitral
process.37 The Court explained that although the “facts of Lagstein’s continuing
disability were hotly contested,” the arbitration panel was justified in finding on
his behalf.38 Further, for a court to consider an arbitration award “irrational,” it
must “fail to draw its essence from the agreement.”39 Lloyd’s did not contend that
the award was contrary to the parties’ contract, but rather that it was insupportable
by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the facts at issue. The Court rejected Lloyd’s
contention explaining that the issue was not whether the award was contrary to the

32

Id; see Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009)
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 640.
34
Id. (citing Stolt-Neilson v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010)).
35
Id.
36
Id. (citing Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, L.P., 336 F.3d, 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.
2003)).
37
Id.
38
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 640.
39
Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
33
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facts of a case, but whether the award is “irrational with respect to the contract”
and its content.40
3.

Public Policy

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Lloyd’s public policy argument.41 The
lower court believed that the size of the award violated public policy because the
arbitrators referenced an insurance benefit that Lagstein had not purchased.42 To
succeed on a public policy challenge, the court or aggrieved party must point to an
overriding public policy “rooted in something more than general considerations of
proposed public interests . . . it must demonstrate that the policy is one that
specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.”43 That an arbitral
award is merely inconsistent with a court’s general views on public policy is not
enough to vacate an award.44
B.

Vacatur of the Punitive Damages
The district court vacated the punitive damages award on grounds that the

arbitral panel no longer had jurisdiction over the dispute after issuing the initial
award.45 But the Court of Appeals reversed, and explained that the “timing of the
arbitration award was a procedural matter” reserved for the panel.46 Although other
courts may have interpreted the parties’ agreement differently, the panel’s
understanding of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate was reasonable. The Court
explained that “[i]n the absence of an express agreement to the contrary,
40

Id.
Id.
42
Id. at 641.
43
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 641 (citing Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists
Lodge No. 117, 886 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989)).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 643.
46
Id.
41
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procedural questions are submitted to the arbitrator . . . along with the merits of the
dispute.”47
The American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures governed the parties’ arbitration agreement,48 and
provide that an award “‘shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties or specified by the law, no later than [thirty] days
from the date of closing the hearing.’”49 After issuing an initial award on August
31, 2006, pursuant to the AAA’s Rule R-38, the panel announced that a punitive
damages hearing would be held at a later date.50 Because the decision to hold a
later hearing was a procedural matter, the Court explained that the arbitrators had
exclusive authority to decide the issue.51 Furthermore, the AAA’s Rule R-43(b)
permits arbitration panels to pursue “interim” or “partial rulings” in addition to
final awards.52 Although the panel had found generally on Lagstein’s behalf, it had
not issued a complete award. The Agreement did not contain a specific date by
which the panel had to determine the final award, and the arbitrators were therefore
free to interpret the contract in a plausible manner.53 The Court recognized that
reasonable judges and arbitrators are often prone to interpreting rules and
agreements in varying ways. If an arbitrator’s interpretation is at least sensible,
however, that interpretation likely will stand.54

47

Id.
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 643.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40
(1987), which held that procedural questions growing out of the dispute are not for the
court but rather for the arbitrator to decide).
52
Id. at 645.
53
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 645.
54
Id.
48
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Vacatur Claim for Want of Arbitrator Impartiality
Lloyd’s final claim rested on his discovery that arbitrators Springer and

Whitehead were concurrently involved in an ethics controversy in 1993.55 He
maintained that their failure to disclose their involvement in the 1993 controversy
warranted vacatur of the award.56 The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that
Lloyd’s had failed to point to evidence indicating an inappropriate relationship
between the arbitrators.57 The Court clarified that evident partiality requires a
demonstration that an arbitrator had actual bias toward a party or that the arbitrator
failed to disclose information that could result in a “‘reasonable impression of
bias.’”58 Lloyd’s failed to meet this burden. The Court explained that the cited
controversy occurred over a decade before the current proceeding, and that all
three arbitrators satisfied their disclosure obligations when they explained their
relationships with the parties and their respective law firms.59
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case, like Hall Street Associates, claims to articulate that the only

means of vacatur are those delineated in FAA § 10, yet discusses methods of
55

Id. at 639. (Arbitrator Whitehead, in 1993, was involved in an ethics controversy that
dealt with the way he handled peremptory strikes entered against him under Nevada’s rule
for peremptory striking of judges. The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline’s
complaint was eventually dropped, although the FBI investigated Whitehead on
“unspecified charges.” Whitehead ended up signing a “non-prosecution agreement,” which
provided that he would retire from the bench, would not seek reelection, and would never
again serve as a judge in any state. Further, a controversy related to the Commission’s
procedures in the matter began, which the Nevada Supreme Court addressed. At the time,
Arbitrator Springer was a member of the Court, and “consistently sided with Whitehead on
these procedural and jurisdictional issues.”).
56
Id. at 645.
57
Id; see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (explaining that evident partiality or corruption on behalf of
any arbitrator will force a court to vacate an otherwise valid arbitral award).
58
Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 645-646 (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145 (1968)).
59
Id. at 646.
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vacatur that lie outside of the statute.60 While the court succeeds in avoiding
merits-based review, it inadvertently clouds the standards by which courts will
review future arbitral awards. In referencing common law methods of vacatur
such as manifest disregard of the law and manifest disregard of the facts, the Court
threatens the efficiency and finality of arbitration rather than enforces it.
Additionally, the Court further confuses the distinction between actual arbitrator
bias and the appearance of arbitrator bias.61 Rather than deciding on a single way
to disqualify an arbitrator for want of impartiality, the Court straddles the line
between both theories, providing dissatisfied parties with further means by which
to challenge arbitral awards. Although this case upholds the panel’s decision and
speaks favorably of the FAA, it has unintentionally allowed for the arbitral process
to become further judicialized.

60

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (holding
that arbitral tribunals must not only be unbiased, but must also seek to avoid even the
appearance of bias) (emphasis added).
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